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F 0 R R E L E A S E F R I D A Y P. M. Is 
LECTURE BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
Sponsored by the 
Maureen and Mike Mansfield Endowment 
(The University of Montana Foundation) 
at the 
University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 
Friday, March 29, 1968, 10:30 a.m., MST 
CHINA: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
Viet Nam is heavy on the heart of the nation. The 
Vietnamese war is a tragedy. It is a tragedy in the American 
lives which it claims . It is a tragedy in the death and devasta-
tlon which, in the name of salvation, it has spread throughout 
Viet Nam. 
My views on United States policy respecting Viet 
Nam are no secret. I have stated them, restated them, and 
elaborated them many times. I have cautioned against an ever-
deepening military involvement in that conflict. I am opposed 
to any increase in it today. I believe that the way out of a 
barbarous situation is not to go further into it. 
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The fi r st s t ep towards p eace, i n my judgment, is 
to concentr ate and consolidate t h e U. S . militar y effort and t o 
escalate the peace - effor t , looking towards the negotiation o f a n 
hon o r able end of the conflict. 
That, in brief, is the way I feel about Viet Nam . 
That is the way I have felt about it for a long time . The Presi-
dent knows it . The Senate knows it . Montana knows it . 
What I have to say to you, today, touches only 
indi r ectly on Viet Nam . My remarks are intended to go beyond 
Viet Nam to what may well be the roots of the war. In this first 
lecture of the se~ies on international affairs, I wish to address 
your attention to what is the great void in the foreign relations 
of this nation--to the question of China . 
As a nation, we have lived thro~gh a generation 
in only heresay association with a third of the enti r e human race . 
At the inception of this void, we were engaged in a costly and 
indecisive conflict in Korea--on China ' s northeast frontier . Two 
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decades later, we are engaged once again in a costly and inde-
cisive conflict, this time on China's southeast frontier. These 
two great military involvements on the Chinese periphery are not 
unrelated to the absence of relevant contact between China and 
the United States. 
Soone~ or later a tenuous truce may be achieved 
in Viet Nam even as a truce ·iA:as achieved in Korea. · In my judg·-
ment, however, there will be no durable peace in Korea, Viet Nam, 
or anywhere else in Asia unles s there is a candid conf:rontation 
with the problems of the Si~o-U . S. relationship. 
China needs peace if the potentials of its culture 
are to be realized. This natio~ needs peace for the same reason. 
In this day and age, the world needs peace for civilized s~rvival. 
You young people have the greatest stake in peace. For that 
reason, I ask you to look beyond Viet Nam, behind Korea, to what 
may well be the core of the failure of peace in Asia-- to the 
U. B.-Chinese estrangement of two decades. 
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In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the Declaration 
of Independ2nce, sent the first American clipper ship to trade 
with China. Th2 year that P:;::es ident George Washington took the 
oath of office, 1789, fourteen American ships were ridi ng at 
anchor in the Pearl River off Canton in South China. 
There are no American ships in Chinese ports today. 
There have not ~een for almost twenty yea rs. In t'lfenty years, 
hardly an Americ&~ doctor, scientist, businessman, journalist, 
student, or even a tourist has set foot in China. 
Ac::oss ti"le Pacific Ocean, ;·;e and -c·~1e Chinese glare 
at one another, uncomprehendingly, apprehensively, and suspici-
ou.sly. I:! the 1..i'ni ted Statss, there is fear of the sudden r.1arch 
of Chinese armies into Southeast Asia. In China, there is fear 
of a tighter American encirclement ai.1d American nuclear attack. 
We see millions o~ Chinese soldiers poised on 
Chinars frontiers. We see lead2rs who threaten in a most violent 
way. We see an internal Chinese turmoil to confirm our fears of 
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irrationality and recklessness. Finally, we see a growing 
nuclear power, with the looming spectre of a full-fledged Chinese 
intercontinental "ballistic missile force. 
On the other hand, the Chinese sec themselves 
surrounded by massive American military power. They see U. S. 
naval, grouDd, and air bases scattered through Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand. They see 
over half a million American troops in neighboring Viet Nam and 
hundrecs of thct:sa;.J.ds more n·.=arby. 'l'he:T see tremendous nuclear 
capability with missiles zeroed in on Chinese cities. They see 
the United Sta.tes as "occupying'' the Chinese island of Taiwan 
and supporting a Chir:.ese government 1>'hose declared aim is the 
recapture of the mainland, And they see, too, what they describe 
as a growing collusion between the Uni ted States and the SovLet 
Uninn, a country which they believe infringes China's borders, 
threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an 
unwelcome influe~lce throughout Asia. 
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We and the Chinese have not always looked at one 
another with such baleful mistrust. The American images of China 
have fluctuated and shifted in an almost cyclical way. There has 
been the image of the China of wisdom, intelligence, industry, 
piety, stoicism, and strength. This is the China of Marco Polo, 
Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan,and heroic resistance to the Japanese 
during World War II. 
On the other hand, there has been the i~age of 
the China of cruelty, barba=ism, viole~cc a~d faceless hordes. 
' 
This is the China of drum-head tri::>.ls, summe.ry E:xenttions, ru 
Manchu,and the Boxer ReJellion--the China that is su~ed up in 
the phrase 11 yellow peril. 11 
Throughout our history, these two jmages have 
alternated) with first one predominant and the~ the other . In 
the eighteenth century, we looked up to China as an ancient 
civilization--superior in many aspects of technology, culture, 
and social orde~ and surrou~ded by an air of splendid myste~y. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 25, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 7 -
Respect tur ned to contempt, howeve r , with China ' s quick defeat by 
the British i n the Opium War of 1840 . There followed acts o f 
humiliation of China such as pa r ticipation in extra- territorial 
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 . 
Attitudes shifted again in the early twentieth 
century to one of benevolence largely in consequence of the influ-
ence of missionaries . There were more missionaries in China from 
the Uni ted States than from any other country . More American 
missionaries served in China than anywhere else in the world . The 
Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored 
people . 
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 
1937 produced another shift from benevolence to admiration . At 
the end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by dis -
appointment and frustration, as the wartime truce between Nation-
alist and Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal 
strife . This nation became profoundly disenchanted with China, a 
disenchantment which was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility . 
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The hostility was largely a reaction, of course, 
to the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese main-
land. We did not interpret this event as a consequence of the 
massive difficulties and the vast inner weaknesses of a war-torn 
China. Rathe~ we saw it almost as an affront to this nation. We 
saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steam-roller 
policies which had reduced Eastern and Central Europe to subservi-
ence at the end of World War II. 
Then, in 1948, came a Communist coup in Czechoslo-
vakia and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin . The triumph of 
a Communist government in China followed immediately after these 
events in Europe . The nation was shaken to its fingertips. 
Still, the press of events continued relentlessly. 
In June 1950, the North Koreans launched a sudden attack on South 
Korea. The Chinese forces intervened in the war in November of 
that year. The United States was brought into a major military 
confrontation in which, for the first time, the Chinese were 
enemies and not allies . 
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After these events, the assumptions of American 
policy towards China were revised. An effort was made to meet 
both the concern and outrage respecting China which existed in 
this nation and the revolutionary militancy of the new Chinese 
regime in Asia. Policy was cast anew on the premise that the 
government on the Chinese mainland was an aggressor which, subject 
to directions from Moscow, would use force to impose international 
Communism on Asia. Conversely, it was assumed that if the 
endorsement of the free nations were with~eld, this regime which 
was said to be 11 alien 11 to the Chinese people-- some sort of over-
grown puppet of Moscow--would wither and eventually collapse. 
On this basis, recognition was not extended to 
Peking. The official vie1,11 was that the National Government, 
which had retreated to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak 
for all of China. We cut off all trade with the mainland and 
did what could be done to encourage other countries to follow 
suit. In a similar fashion, we led a diplomatic campaign year 
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after year against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic 
in the United Nations. We drew an arc of military alliances on 
the seaward side of China and undergirded them with the deploy-
ment of massive American military power in bases throughout the 
Western Pacific. 
Much has happened to call into question the assump-
tions in which these policies towards China have been rooted. In 
the first place, the People's Republic has shown itself to be 
neither a part of a Communist monolith nor a carbon copy of Sovi et 
Russia. The fact is that,of the numerous divisions which have 
arisen within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow 
and Peking have been the most significant. They so remain today 
although the more rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat 
tempered by the war i n Viet Nam. 
At the same time, the government on the mainland 
has not only survived, it has provided China with a functioning 
leadership. Under its direction, Chi nese society has achieved a 
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degree of economic and scientific progress, apparently sufficient 
for survival of an enormous and growing population and sophisti -
cated enough to produce thermo- nuclear explosions . 
In the last two years, the so- called Cultural 
Revolution in China has rekindled what has bee~ a periodic expecta-
tion that the Peking government is on the verge of collapse and 
the way is open for a military return to the mainland of the 
National Government on Taiwan . There seems to be little doubt 
that the turmoil in China has caused serious disruptions . What 
appears in conflict in the cultural revolution, however, is not 
the Peking structure as such but the adequacy of its ideological 
content. That would be a far cry from the kind of popular revul-
sion which might be expected to open the doors to a new regime . 
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within 
China appear to have ended months ago, without any irreparable 
break in the continuity of the government or the operations of 
the economy. It is ·the height of folly to envision, in ~he 
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p r esent sit l a t ion, an occasion for the over throw of the Peking 
government by ext ernal military pressures . Indeed, what would 
be better calcuJ ated to end, overnight, the remaining ferment on 
the mainland ~han a plausible threat to the security of China or 
an actual attack on Chinese territory? 
If the People's Republic, then, is here to stay, 
what of the other assumption on which thj_s nation's policy respect-
ing China has long been based? ~~t of the assumption that the 
Chinese government is an expanding and aggressive force? That 
it is r estrained from s~eeping through Asia because we have electe( 
to meet its challenge along the 17th Parallel which divides the 
Northern and Southern parts of Viet Nam? 
In recent years, the present Chinese government 
has not shown any great eagerness to use force to spread its 
elsewhere in Asia 
ideology/although Chinese armies have been employed in assertion 
of the traditional borders of China. To be sure, China has given 
enthusiastic encouragement and has promised to support wars of 
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national liberation. However, China has not participated 
directly in these wars and support, when it has been forthcoming, 
has been limited and circumspect. 
In Viet Nam, for example, there is certainly 
Chinese encouragement and aid for the North Vietnamese and the 
Viet Cong. Chinese involvement, however, has beenfar more peri-
pheral than our own. The enemy soldiers with whom we are compeller 
to grapple are all Vietnamese and, in fact, mostly South VietnamesE 
At every stage of the war, the assistance we have provided to 
South Viet Nam has far exceeded the aid from China and from all 
outside sources to the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam--both in terms 
of men and materiel. There is Chinese equipment in South Viet 
Nam but there are no Chinese battalions. Even in North Viet Nam, 
Chinese manpower is reported to amount, at most, to one-tenth of 
our forces in Viet Nam, and the great bulk of these Chinese are 
labor troops, some involved in air-defense but most of them 
engaged in repairing bomb damage to roads, rai.lroads, bridges, 
and the like. 
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Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan 
frontier of India,are often cited as evidence of militant Chinese 
Communist aggression . The fact is, however, that Tibet has been 
regarded, for many dec0des, as falling within China's over- all 
boundaries. Not only the Peking government but also the Chinese 
National Government on Taiwan insiststhat Tibet belongs to China . 
India also acknowledges such to be the case . Indeed, American 
policy has never recognized Tibet as other than Chinese territory . 
In the case of the border war with India in 1962, 
the Chinese Communists occupied territories which, again, not 
only they, but also the Chinese Nationalists, consider to be 
Chinese. It is not precisely characteristj_c of a militant 
expansionism, moreover, for a government to withdraw its military 
forces from a territory which they have invested. Yet, the Peking 
government did so from parts of India which were occupied i n 
1962 as well as from North Korea . 
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As for indirect aggression through economic means, 
China has been able to exert only a limited influence, either 
through aid or trade. In Africa and, indeed, in Southeast Asia, 
where attempts have been made to use trade and aid for political 
ends, the results have not been conspicuously successful . The 
fact is that most of China's trade today rests on a commercial-
economic base. It is carried on largely with the non-Communist 
countries, including, may I add, many of our closest allies. 
In short, to speak of China, today, as aggressively· 
expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather than Chinese 
actions. That is not to say that China will not pose all manne2' 
of threats tomorrow . If there are not enough nightmares already~ 
consider the prospects when China's nuclear capabilities will 
have been extensively developed, along with a full-fledged inter-
continental ballistic missile force. 
Of course, there is an immens.e potential danger 
in China; but there is also an immense potential danger in every 
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other powerful nation i n a world whi ch has not yet learned how 
to maintain civilized survival in a nuclear age except on the 
razor's edge. Insofar as China is concerned, the fundamental 
question for us is not whether it is a danger, real or potential . 
The fundamental question is whether our present policies act to 
alleviate or t o exacerbate the danger. Do we forestall the 
dange r by jousting with the shadows and suspicions of the past? 
Do we help by a continuance in policies which do little if any-
thing t o lift the heavy curtain of mutual ignorance and hostility? 
Like it or not, the present Chinese government is 
here to stay . Like it or not, China is a major power in Asia and 
is on the way to becoming a nuclear power . Is it, therefore, in 
this nation's interest and in the i nterest of world peace to put 
aside, once and for all, what have been the persistent but futile 
attempts to isolate China? Is it, therefore, in this nation's 
i nterest and in the interest of world peace to try conscientiously 
aEd consistently to do whatever we can do- - and, admittedly, it is 
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not much-- to reshape the relationship with the Chinese along more 
constructive and stable lines? In short, is it propitious fo r 
this n ation to try to do what, in fact , the policies of most of 
the other Western democracies have already long since done r egard-
ing their Chinese relationships? 
I must say t hat the deepening of the conflict in 
Viet Nam makes more difficult adjustments in policies respecting 
China . Indeed, the present co~rse of events in Viet Nam almost 
insures that there shall be no changes . It is not easy to con-
template an alleviation with any nation which cheers on those 
who are engaged in inflicting casualties on Amricans . Yet, it 
may well be that this alleviation is an essential aspect of end-
ing the vJar and, hence, American casualties . That consideration, 
alone, it seems to me, makes desirable initiatives towards China 
at this time . 
There are several obvious areas in which these 
initiatives would have relevance . Discriminatory restriction 
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on travel to China, for example, is certainly one of these areas. 
The Chinese may or may not admit Americans to their country, as 
they choose. But it is difficult t o understand why our own 
government should in any way, shape, or form seek to stand in the 
way of the attempts of American citizens to breech the great wall 
of estrangement between the two nations . It is, indeed, iron ic 
that during the past three years ~here have been more visits of 
Americans t o North Viet Nam, a nation with which we are ~t war, 
than to China in the past thirteen years . 
On the question of travel, it should be recalled 
that the Chinese were the first to suggest in 1956 that American 
journalists visit China. The suggestion was summarily rejected 
by the then Secretary of State . When, later , it was decided to 
accept the suggestion, the Chinese had changed their minds. 
Since that time, thjs nation has been more inclined to ease the 
travel barriers, on the basis of offi cial agr eement for exchanges 
of persons, but the Chinese have shown no disposition to enter 
into agreements or, for that matter, to admit Americans on any 
basis . 
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In any event, it seems to me tha t it is in the 
positive interest of this nation to encourage Americans, if they 
can gain entry, to travel to China . May I add, I refer not merely 
to the travel of selected journalists, doctors, and other speci-
alists, as is now the policy, but to the travel of any responsible 
American< In the same fashion, it seems to me most appropriate 
to admit Chinese travelers to the United States under the same 
conditions that pertain to visitors from other Communist countries . 
T~ade is anot her area iL which long-standing poli -
cies respecting Chi na &re open to seriow.s question. Technically, 
this country still maintains an emba:-go on all trade with China . 
The basis for this policy is compliance with a voluntary resolu-
tion of the United Nations which was adopte d at our behest at the 
time of the Korea::1 conflict. It is doubtful that the resolut1on 
ever carried much weight among the trading nations of the world. 
In any case, it has long since been forgotten . Today, the princi-
pal nations in the Chj_na trade in rough order of importance e.r~; 
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the United Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, West Germany, 
Australia, Canada, Italy, and France. Of all the great maritime 
nations, the United States alone clings to a total trade embargo 
with China. Moreover, we are also the only nation in the 
world which makes an effort to enforce what can best be described 
as a kind of secondary boycott of re-exported Chinese products. 
These policies have had little visible economic 
impact, but they have had the most se~ious political repercussions. 
It is conceivable that, to the Chinese, the policies are something 
of an irritant. To friendly nations, however, they have been a 
source of constant friction. Most serious, their continuance 
over the years has injected unnecessary venom into the atmosphere 
of U. S.-Chinese relations. 
Nor ca~ it be said that the situation in Viet Nam 
has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boycott. The fact 
is th2t these restrictions were in place before most Americans 
ever heard of Viet Nam, and, certainly, long before Americans 
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became involved in the war. If the Vietnamese conflict is now 
seen as justifi cation for leaving these policies undisturbed, 
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward trade with 
other Communist countri es? 
The fact is that the European Communists are pro-
vi ding North Vi et Nam and the Viet Co~g with sophisticated mili-
tary equipment which, from all reports, exceeds in value the 
ass i stance which comes from China, On what basis, then, is it 
meaningful to permit and even to enco~rage non-strategic t r ade 
wi th the European Communist countrie s while holdi ng to a closed-
door policy on trade with China? 1iJhat constructive purpose is 
served by the distinct i on? Any rationalization of relations with 
China, it seems to me, will require an adjustment of thi s dual 
approach . We need to move in the direction of equal treatment 
of all Communist nations in trade matters, whatever that treat-
ment may be. 
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In any event, problems of travel and trade are 
secondary obstacles in the development of a more stable relation-
ship between China and the United States . There are other far 
mor e significant difficulties. I refer, principally, to the 
question of Taiwan and to the war in Viet Nam. 
There is no doubt that the Chinese government seeks 
in v:et Nama government which is friendly, if not subservient . 
Peking has not concealed, moreover, its desire for the withdrawal 
of American military power from Southeast Asta . It does not 
f8llow, however, that the price of peace in Southeast Asia is 
either Chinese domination or U. S. military intervention. That 
is a black and white oversimplification of a gray situation . The 
fact is that neither Burma on China's border nor Cambodia have 
been "enslaved" by China, despite an association of many years, 
despite periodic djfficulties with the great state to the north 
and despite an absence of U. S . support, aid, or protection. 
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ment from the power rivalries of the region. Furthermore, China 
is a signatory to the settlements which emerged from the Geneva 
Conferences of 1954 and 1962 and which contain at least a hope 
for a middle way to peace in Indo-China. So far as I am aware, 
the Chinese have not been found in direct or unilateral violation 
of these agreements. It is not impossible that a similar settle-
ment,with Chinese participation, might be reached on Viet Nam . 
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped that there can 
be a solution along these lines. Unless it is found, there is 
a very real danger--as the Korean experience shows--that the pro-
longation of war on China's frontiers may well bring about 
another U. S. -Chinese armed confrontation. 
Perhaps the most important element in the rebuild-
ing of stable relations with China is to be found in a solution 
of the problem of Taiwan. It may help to come to grips with this 
issue, if it is understood at the outset that the island of 
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Taiwan is Chinese . That is the position of the National Govern-
ment of t he Republic of China . That i s the position of t he 
People ' s Republic of China . For a quarter of a century, this 
common Chinese posi t ion has been reinforced by the policies and 
actions of the United States government . 
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a 
solution to the Taiwan question is facilitated by its statement 
in terms of a two - China policy, as has been suggested in some 
quarters in recent years . The fact is that there is one China 
which happens to have been divided into two parts by events which 
occurred a long time ago . Key factors in the maintenance of 
peace betwee~ the separate segments have been the interposition 
of U. S. military power in the Taiwan stra i ts, and the strengthen-
ing of the National Government of China by massive injections of 
economic and military aid . 
This course was followed by the United States for 
many reasons, not the least of which was that it made possibl e 
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a refuge for dedicated allies and associates in the war against 
Japan . Most of all, however, it was followed because to have 
permitted the closing of the breech by a military clash of the 
two opposing Chinese forces would have meant a massive bloodbath 
and, in the end, the rekindling of another great war in Asia . 
However, the situation has changed in the Western 
Pacific . Taiwan is no longer abjectly dependent for its survival 
on the United States . Some of the passions of the deep Chinese 
political division have cooled with the passing of time . Another 
generation has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect, 
have grown up on both sides of the Tl iwan straits . 
Is there not, then, some better way to confront 
this problem than threat-and-counter-threat between island 
Chinese and mainland Chinese? Is there not some better way to 
live with this situation than by the armed truce which depends, 
in the last analysis, on the contj_nued presence of the U. S. 7th 
Fleet in the Taiwan Straits? 
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The questions cannot be answered until all 
involved are prepared to take a fresh look at the situation. It 
seems to me that it might be helpful if there could be, among the 
Chinese themselves, an exami nation of the possj_bilities of 
improving the climate. As I have already indicated, the proper 
framework for any such consideration would be an acceptance of 
the contention of both Chinese groups--that there is only one 
China and Taiwan is a part of it . In that context, the questions 
at issue have to do with the dichotomous si~uation as between 
mainland and island governments and the possibility of bringing 
about constr~ctive changes therein by peaceful means. 
There is no cause to be sanguine about the pro-
spects of an approach of this kind . One can only hope that ti'!le 
may have helped to ripen the circumstances for settlement. It 
is apparent, for example, that the concept whi ch held the 
Chinese government on Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's 
redemption has grown less relevant with the years. For Taiwan, 
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therefore, to remain isolated from the mainland is to court the 
risk that the island will be left once again, as it has been on 
other occasions, in the backwash of Chinese history. 
The removal of the wedge of separation, moreover, 
would also seem to accord with the interests of the mainland 
Chinese goverrunent. It does have a legitimate concern in the 
reassertion of the historic connection of Taiwan and China. It 
does have a concern in ending the hostile division which has 
been costly and disruptive both within China and in China's 
internat 1onal relationships. 
FrCJm the point of view of the United States, too, 
there is an interest in seeking a less tenuous situation. Progresi 
in settling the 'I'aiwan question could contribute to a general 
relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific and, conceivably, 
even to resolution of the conflict i n Viet Nam. Certainly, it 
would make possible a reduction in the enormous and costly over-
all defense burdens which were assumed in Asian waters afte:r Wo --:·ld 
l ,. . 
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War II and which, two decades later, still rest on the shoulders 
of this nation . 
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic 
adjustment which is needed in policies respecting China is to 
make crystal clear that this government does not anticipate, much 
less does it seek, the overthrow of the government of the Chinese 
mainland . In addition, there is a need t o end the discrimination 
which consigns China to an inferior s tat·._,s as among the Communist 
countri es in this nat ion 's policies respecting travel and trade. 
Finally, it ought to be made uneq1.:ivocal that we are prepared at 
all times t o meet with Chinese representatives--formally o~ 
informally--in order to consider differences between China and 
the United States over Viet Nam or any other question of common 
concern . 
Adjustments of this kind in the policies of the 
nation, it seems to me, require above all else a fresh perspec-
tive . We need to see the situation in Asia as it is today, not 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 44, Folder 25, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- :;19-
as it appeared twenty years ago in the Himalayan upheaval of the 
Chinese revolution . We need to see the situation not through 
the fog of an old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the 
enduri~g interests of the United States in the Western Pacific. 
In this context we will setter be able to find 
appropriate responses at appropriate times to the specific 
problems of the Sino-U. S. relationship, whether they have to do 
with U. N. representation or diplomatic recognition or the off-
shore islands or whatever. Without prior adjustment i n perspec-
tive, however, to seek to deal definitively with these questions 
would be, to say the least, an exercise in futility. 
I should emphasize before concluding that it is 
unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese responses to 
initiatives on our part. Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost 
for this nation in trying to move along the lines which have 
been suggested. Chinese intransigence is no license for American 
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intransigence . Our stake in the situation in the Western Pacific 
is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence . 
I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the 
issues which divide China and the United s·tates to see if they 
can be recast in new and uncluttered molds. '.!.,here is every 
reason, especially for young people, to exa'"lline most closely the 
premises of policy r egarding China which were enshrined almost 
two decades ago . The fact is that "Che b:rea.l<.down j_n Chinese-U.S. 
relations was cne of the great failures of my generation and it 
is highly doubtful that its full repair shall be seen in my life-
time. The problem, therefore , will fall largely to you. It is 
not a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason to hop2 
that it may fare better i n your hands. 
Ur..like my generation, you. know mo1:·e a"'..Jout Asia . 
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation 
and to the world. ln 1942, four months after Pearl Harbor, for 
example, an opinion poll found that sixty pe:::·cent of a nationo.l 
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sample of Americc.ns still could not locate either China or India 
on an outline rna~ of the world. Certainly that would not be the 
case today. ~rthermore, you have not had the experience of 
national trauma in moving abruptly f~om an era marked by an 
almost fawning benevolence toward China to one of thorough dis-
enchantment. You weYe spared the fierce hostilities which rent 
this nation internally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and 
security regarding China gave way to feelings of rev~lsion, 
hatred, and insecurity. 
Your Chinese counterparts, the young people of 
toC.ay's China--they are called the !IHeirs of the Revolut i on!f--
have a similar gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific. 
Your generation in China, too, has been contained and isolated, 
a;,1d its view of the United States has been colored wi t!:l the hates 
of another time. It has had no contact with you or, indeeJ, with 
much of the world outside China . 
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On the other hand, those young people have grown 
up under easier conditions than the older generation of Chinese 
who lived their youth in years of conti nuous war and revolution. 
It may be that they can face you and the rest of the world with 
greater equanamity and assurance than has been the case at any 
time in modern Chinese history. 
I urge you to think for yourselves about China. 
I urge you to approach, with a new objectivity, that vast nation, 
with its great population of industrious and intelligent people. 
Bear in mind that the peace of Asia and the world will depend on 
China as much as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any 
other, not because China is Communist but because China is China--
among the largest countries in the world and the most populous. 
Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an interview several years 
ago that "future events would be decided by future generations." 
Insofar as his words involve the relationship of thi s nat ion and 
China , whether they prove to be a prophecy of d~om or a fo~ecast 
of a happier future will depend not so much on us , the 11 0ld China. 
Hand.s " of yesterday, but on you, the "New American Hands" of 
tomorrow. 
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